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Derivatives allow corporations to insulate themselves from, amplify, or
otherwise modulate the impact of changes in interest and exchange rates and
commodity, equity, and real estate prices .... [E]ven changes in statutory
income tax rates can be hedged against .... [Clorporations can increasingly
determine the market and legal environment in which they will operate. If
clever and careful enough, a corporation can avoid the chaos of the real
world... [and] enter a private "derivative reality," a synthetic world purged
of risks it deems undesirable. 1
Despite the risk-free nirvana described above, derivatives have played a
role in the collapse of England's most venerable bank,2 the bankruptcy of the
richest county in California, 3 and a financial leader facing lawsuits and
sanctions4 due to losses by its large, supposedly sophisticated clients. 5 Why is
there such a huge chasm between the ideal and the reality?6 Critics claim that
* I would like to thank my parents for their unconditional support and Professor
Morgan Shipman for his advice, assistance, and entertainment.
1 Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and
Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 "'Ex. L. REv. 985, 986 (1995).
2 Body Blow to Barings, FIN. TAIES (London), Feb. 27, 1995, at 17.
3 Floyd Norris, Orange County Crisis Jolts Bond Market: From a Bankruptcy,
Fears About Losses, N.Y. TmES, Dec. 8, 1994, at D17.
4 Saul Hansell, Bankers Trust and U.S. Set Pact on Disclosure of Derivatives'
Risk, N.Y. Tems, Dec. 6, 1994, at Al (describing an agreement with the Federal
Reserve Bank to increase disclosures); Saul Hansell, Settlement by Bankers Trust Unit,
N.Y. TWEs, Dec. 23, 1994, at Dl (reporting that Banker's Trust ("BT"), the nation's
seventh largest bank, "agreed to pay a $10 million fine to settle charges that its
securities unit hid the extent of a client's losses from trading derivatives").
5 G. Bruce Knecht, P&G Amends Lawsuit Naming Bankers Trust: Second
Derivative Action Is Added and Company Alleges U.S. Violations, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7,
1995, at A3 (describing increased demands and allegations by Proctor & Gamble
("P&G")); Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Says P&G Deal Wasn't Unique, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 22, 1994, at Cl (reporting BT's response to P&G's complaint); Michael Quint,
Gibson Suit on Trades Is Settled: Bankers Trust Gets 30% of Debt Claimed, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1994, at D1 (settling suit with BT charging that BT led Gibson into
risky investments).
6Recently derivatives disasters have made numerous headlines. See, e.g.,
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these breakdowns must be addressed or the entire financial system will be in
jeopardy.7 Proponents claim that these losses were instead caused by
knowledge and internal control breakdowns and do not indicate that derivatives
are inherently dangerous or require legislative action. 8 In spite of losses, public
concern, 9 and Congressional threats,10 derivatives use continues unabated due
to superior profit potential and risk management flexibility. 1' Because the
Determined Loser, ECONONUST, Apr. 16, 1994, at 82 (reporting that Kashima Oil lost
$1.5 billion in currency transactions); Michael Siconolfi, Kidder Discloses Seam in
Bonds, Fires Top Trader: It Sets $350 Million Charge, Says Scheme Involved
Government-Strip Deals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1994, at A3 (reporting Kidder,
Peabody losses of $350 million in "phantom" derivatives trades); Jeffrey Taylor
& Allanna Sullivan, German Firm Finds Hedges Can Be Thorny, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10,
1994, at Cl; Peter Truell, Wisconsin Has Big Loss in Derivatives: Officials Play Down
Deficit of $95 Million, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1995, at Dl.
7 Saul Hansell, G.A.O. Seeks Sweeping Rules for Derivatives, N.Y. TIrms, May
19, 1994, at Dl.
8 Arguing against legislation, Cathy Minehan, the president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, said "[o]ld-fashioned management controls, attention to separation of
powers and the use of reasonable conflict-of-interest standards would have spotted every
one of those derivative collapses." James Srodes, Warning Labels, FIN. WoRLD, Jan. 2,
1996, at 16. However, "spotting" is not preventing. See Bryan H. Booth, Note,
Prudence or Paranoia: Considering Stricter Regulation of the International Over-the-
Counter Derivatives Market, 5 DUKE J. COM. & INT'L L. 499, 526 (1995) (concluding
that systemic risk is exaggerated and regulation will do more harm than good).
9 The Orange County bankruptcy made it very clear that derivatives can affect
citizens without substantial portfolios who neither knew nor cared about what new
innovations Wall Street was concocting.
10 In 1994, Congress considered, but did not pass, a number of bills to regulate
derivatives. See, e.g., Markey Says Kidder Events Show Derivatives Oversight Needed,
26 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1112 (Aug. 12, 1994). Recently, however,
there has been considerably less interest in legislative action. See discussion infra Part
II.
11 Jay Light, Professor of Finance at Harvard Business School, describes
derivatives as the "fastest-growing financial instrument of our time, as measured either
by the rate of growth of new contracts or by the amount of existing contracts" and
points out that the futures volume trading is several times greater than the trading on the
New York Stock Exchange. Jay Light, The Use of Derivatives, in Cathy E. Minehan
& Katerina Simons, Managing Risk in the '90s: What Should You Be Asking About
Derivatives?, NEw ENG. ECON. Rv., Sep.-Oct. 1995, at 3, 5. "The worldwide
notional/contract amounts for [derivatives] increased from $7.1 trillion in 1989 to $62.1
trillion in 1994." 61 Fed. Reg. 578, 578 n.6 (1996) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
210, 228, 229, 239, 240, and 249) (proposed Jan. 1996). In the United States alone, a
low estimate of the derivatives market is $12 trillion, "more than three times the total
assets of all US banks." Richard Evans, Future Imperfect, MGMT. TODAY, July 1995,
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creation and use of derivatives show no signs of slowing down, the most
important issue to be resolved is how best to close the "understanding gap" and
minimize losses and ensuing litigation. The purpose of this Note is to
recommend immediate action to be undertaken mostly by the private sector to
effectively utilize derivatives. A lesser role is envisioned for public and private
regulating bodies to ensure consistency in reporting in order to protect the
investing public and market stability.
Part I of this Note will begin by describing derivatives and why they are so
valuable, as well as risky. The difficulties of legislative action and regulation
will then be discussed in Part H, concluding that wide-scale regulation, though a
desirable goal, may be premature. Part III will detail an immediate proposal to
enhance the safety of derivatives with efforts by market participants and
regulatory bodies. The major provisions of this proposal include: (1) increased
participation and expertise by directors and senior management; (2) clear,
properly enforced derivatives policies; (3) strengthened internal control
systems; (4) adequate resources and training provided to personnel; (5) full
disclosure of policies and methodologies to financial statement users; and
(6) implementation of consistent accounting and disclosure standards by the
appropriate private and public regulatory bodies. The legal consequences of
participants' failure to act will also be briefly discussed. Finally, Part IV will
apply this short-term solution to recent derivatives catastrophes to test whether
it would have prevented or mitigated them.
I. BACKGROUND
A derivative is a financial contract whose value is derived from an
underlying asset, rate, or index. 12 These "underlyings" include stocks, bonds,
commodities, interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates, financial product
indices, 13 and other assets, including other derivatives.14 Despite this rather
abstract definition, a common example of a derivative contract occurs when a
farmer, worried about what the price of his crop might be in six months when it
at 64, 64. However, estimates as to the size of the derivatives market are often
misleading because the total value of all derivatives ignores that these contracts
frequently are held by the same party in offsetting positions-so the risk is only the
difference. Global Derivatives Study Group, Derivatives: Practices and Principles 28,
at 53-54 (Group of Thirty Report eds., 1993).
12 Adam R. Waldman, Comment, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative
Finance or the Dance into the Abyss, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 1023, 1026 (1994).
13 An example of one of these indices is the Standard and Poor 500.
1 4 GENERAL ACCr. OFF. REP., FINANCLAL DERIvATIVEs: ACTIONs NEEDED TO
PROTECr THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 24 (May 1994) [hereinafter GENERAL AccT. OFF.
REP.].
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is harvested, enters into a futures contract to lock in a price now. 15 Although
these instruments have grown increasingly complex, 16 the basic types of
derivatives are forwards, futures, 17 options, and swaps.' 8 Further, all
derivatives have characteristics of either option or forward contracts, or some
combination thereof.
Option-based derivatives have elements of traditional option contracts.
They provide the holder with the right "to buy or sell an underlying financial
instrument, foreign currency or commodity" at a specified price in return for a
premium paid to the counterparty, the option writer.19 Option-based derivatives
are one-sided because only the holder has the opportunity to exercise the option
and benefit from favorable price movements. 20 Therefore, the option holder has
limited risk while the option writer has unlimited exposure.21 For example, a
manufacturing company which needs oil for its operations may desire an option
to purchase a given quantity of oil at a certain "strike"price2 at some date in
the future, in case of an oil embargo or conflict in the Middle East. In this way,
the manufacturer is able to control a risk over which it otherwise would have no
control and thus concentrate on the business at hand. If the price of oil
decreases, the manufacturer will simply let the option expire; it has incurred the
15 Because futures are traded on an organized exchange, the Chicago Board of
Trade, the farmer need not seek out a counterparty with needs counter to his or her own
to make this transaction. However, the price of this contract will depend on the demand
for a counter position, as well as other market factors. For example, another company
which depends on the farmer's crop for its livelihood-say a canning company-may
also wish to lock in a certain price for the produce, guaranteeing a profit at a specified
selling price. This company would "gain" if the market price of the produce rose above
the futures price on the date of delivery.
16 One study found more than 1200 derivative products currently available. See
Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds," "General Custer," and the Regulation of
Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SErON HALL L. REv. 1, 2 n.4 (1994).
17 Futures, like forwards, obligate the holder to buy or sell for a specific amount,
but are primarily traded on organized exchanges in standardized contracts. See
GENmAL Accr. OFF. REP., supra note 14, at 5.
18 Swap contracts "are agreements between counterparties to make periodic
payments to each other for a specified period." Id.
19 Roger H.D. Molvar & James F. Green, The Question of Derivatives: There May
Be More Questions than Answers, J. AcCT., Mar. 1995, at 55, 57.
20 See id.
21 Many option writers, however, usually hedge their positions by selling an
opposite position to another end-user.
22 The strike price is the price at which the option is exercised. See FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS TASK FORCE, AMERICAN INsT. CERTImE PUB. ACcr., DERIvATIvos-
CURRENT ACCOUNTING AND Aui)mNG LITERATURE 12 (1994) [hereinafter AMERICAN
INsT. CERTnI D PUB. ACcr.].
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premium paid on the option as its "insurance" cost. On the other hand, if the
price of oil soars, the manufacturer will be able to purchase its much needed oil
at well under the market price. Other commonly used option-based derivatives
include interest rate caps, floors, collars,23 and embedded written options. 24
Forward contracts bind one party to buy and the counterparty to sell a
"financial instrument, foreign currency, or commodity at a future date" and at a
specified price.2 Forward-based derivatives contain traditional forward
characteristics. Forwards are two-sided contracts because they provide the
holder as well as the writer with both the benefits of favorable price movements
and exposure to loss from unfavorable price movements. 26 Also, there is
typically no payment at contract inception.2 7 A forward contract may be used
when an American importer contracts to purchase German machinery payable
in German marks upon delivery one year from the contract date. 28 The
importer may wish to lock in a U.S. dollar cost for the equipment in its
machinery budget.29 Thus, the importer "may enter [] into a foreign exchange
forward contract to purchase the exact amount of marks needed to pay" for the
equipment on the date of delivery.30 The importer will avoid a loss if the dollar
cost of German currency increases by the date of delivery. 31 Commonly used
forward-based derivatives include futures, forwards, and swap contracts. 32 The
aforementioned building blocks of forward and option-based derivatives are
23 Interest rate caps, floors, and collars are combinations of individual interest rate
options which enable holders to limit rate increases (capping the rate) or decreases
(putting a floor on the rate) on floating rate instruments, or both, by using a "collar."
See id. at 12-13.
24 These options embedded in contracts may be exercised by the counterparty
issuer if certain events occur, and may increase risks assumed by the end-user. Because
embedded options and other variations may affect the amount, rate, or payments, there
exists the "potential to produce higher cash inflows or outflows than similar instruments
that do not contain the ... feature." Id. at 17. Typical examples are often termed
hybrid securities, or "debt with embedded interest rate risk management derivatives."
CHARLES W. SMITHSON ET AL., MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK: A GUIDE TO DERiVATIVE
PRODUCTS, FINANCIAL ENGIEERMNG, AND VALUE MAxMIzATON 24 (rev. ed. 1995).
25 Molvar & Green, supra note 19, at 57.
26 See id.
27 That is, unlike in the case of an option contract, no premium for writing the
instrument occurs at inception.
28 See GENERAL AccT. OFF. REP., supra note 14, at 26.
29 See id.
3 0 1d.
31 See GENERAL AccT. OFF. REP., supra note 14, at 26-27.
32 See Molvar & Green, supra note 19, at 57. These dervivatives include a myriad
of derivations, like basis, foreign currency, and equity swaps.
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often combined, resulting in more complex products like swaptions. 33 Unique
features of derivatives often include little or no cash flows at inception,34 no
principal balance or other fixed amount to be paid or received, and "potential
risks and rewards substantially greater than the amounts recognized in the
statement of financial position. "35
Many derivatives are relatively straightforward, traded on an exchange or a
central clearinghouse, 36 and heavily regulated and controlled. 37 Exchange-
traded derivatives are standard as to amount and duration and include "futures,
certain options, and other standardized contracts."38 These derivatives can be
purchased by simply contacting a broker and are guaranteed by the exchange or
a related clearinghouse. 39 However, the most complex, fastest growing, and
potentially disastrous derivatives are privately traded over-the-counter
("OTC"),40 with a counterparty who is not an organized exchange. 41 OTC
derivatives have no clearinghouse, largely escape regulation, and contain no
guarantees of contract performance. 42 OTC derivatives are negotiated and
33 Primarily used for interest rate risk management, a swaption is an option on a
swap which entitles the holder to "the right to enter into an interest rate swap in the
future," and which can be exercised to either pay or receive a fixed interest rate.
SMrrHSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 368.
34 This feature makes the derivative attractive to end-users but also creates
accounting problems because traditional accounting is cash-based, so many derivatives
are not accounted for in the body of the financial statements where they are most useful
for investors. See infra Part III.B. 1.
35 AMERicAN INsT. CERITmm PuB. AccT., supra note 22, at 5.
36 Derivatives, however, are certainly not risk-free. See infra Part IV.A (discussing
Barings Bank's collapse due to foreign currency trading).
37 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") and the Securities
Exchange Commission ("SEC') scrutinize the futures and options exchanges. In
addition, they have "broad authority to monitor transactions," require registration and
financial disclosures, and intervene in the marketplace to maintain fair, orderly trading
if necessary. See Markham, supra note 16, at 2 n.6 and accompanying text.
38 AMmacAN INsT. Cm mw PuB. AccT., supra note 22, at 7.
39 Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational
Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1465
(1993) (book review). Hu notes that exchange-traded derivatives must be standardized
and "generate enough trading to support a liquid market." Id.
40 In general, OTC derivatives, unlike those traded on an exchange, do not offer
physical settlement, standardized terms, liquidity, or transparency. See SMrSmsON ET
AL., supra note 24, at 389.
41 OTC derivatives can be privately negotiated between two counterparties with a
financial institution acting as an intermediary.
42 Hu, supra note 39, at 1465.
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customized to meet the specific needs of the end-user,43 using variations on
terms or combining derivatives. 44 Countless digressions are also possible,
requiring the end-user to take action or the derivative to change terms if certain
conditions or specified events occur.45 These modifications allow specific
tailoring to meet a user's planned needs and risk profile, but they make the
derivative much more difficult to value, assess for risk, properly account for,
and understand. Complex OTC derivatives comprise the primary focus of this
Note, although much of the discussion applies equally to exchange-traded and
"plain vanilla" derivatives. Because of the frequent lack of standardization and
liquidity,46 as well as the fluctuation of underlying indicators, the value of
derivatives is difficult to measure and more volatile than traditional financial
instruments.47 Indeed, many OTC dealers utilize a staff of mathematicians and
Ph.D.s with supercomputers to create and evaluate derivatives. Products named
"mambo combo," "rambos," "geishas," "surf and turn," and "death-backed
bonds"48 fail to give confidence in these financial rocket scientists' sanity, let
alone competence.
A. Users and Uses
Derivatives are used to manage risk, to seek a profit, or to obtain lower
financing or transactions costs, although in practice it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish between these objectives.49 Generally, end-users seek counterparty
43 Noted derivatives expert and consultant Charles Smithson states that "OTC
products have expanded the number of tools available for hedging risk by offering
longer maturities, greater position size, cash settlement, and overall better customized
payoffs." SMrrHSON Er AL., supra note 24, at 389.
44 An example is the combination of a currency swap and an interest-rate swap,
which "allows the end-user to manage more than one risk simultaneously." AMRICAN
INST. CERTImD PUB. AccT., supra note 22, at 1.
45 See id. at 20. Examples of complicated variations which may be added to the
derivative contract include: increases or decreases in the notional amount based on
certain changes in interest rates, increases or decreases in interest rates based on a
multiplier, additional payments required under specified conditions, and settlement
payment required upon the expiration of a contract. See id.
46 Liquidity of derivatives depends on the size of their secondary markets, which
decreases as the products become more tailored and have longer terms. See Booth,
supra note 8, at 519. This lack of liquidity can be true for exchange-traded derivatives
as well as OTC derivatives.
47 See id.
48 Glenn Alan Cheney, FASB Wins for Speed, Not Scope, on Derivatives, AcCr.
TODAY, Nov. 7, 1994, at 12; see also Waldman, supra note 12, at 1027.
49 See SMrrHSON Er AL., supra note 24, at 61-62.
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broker/dealers to purchase or write derivatives to meet their specific needs. The
OTC derivatives market is generally limited to large end-users, 50 including not
only commercial and financial institutions but also government entities,51 non-
profit organizations, 52 and institutional investors like pensions plans and mutual
or hedge funds. 53 OTC derivatives dealers include a short list of securities
flrms, 54 insurance companies, and large money-center banks.55 This
concentrated group of dealers provides some liquidity to the OTC market by its
activity. 56 These dealers will have many of the same purposes as end-users, but
also earn income by meeting the demand for derivatives.
1. Risk Management
Enterprises are exposed to, and attempt to control, a variety of risks.57
Derivatives are largely used to manage interest rate, foreign exchange, and
commodity price risks.58 The heightened demand for derivatives accompanied
fundamental changes in global financial markets and international trade. This
50 A few years ago, the average contract size for interest rate swaps was $30
million. See Hu, supra note 39, at 1465 n.29. Therefore, private investors lack the
capital, expertise, and clout to enter the OTC market by negotiating directly with
dealers; however, there are certainly some very wealthy private individuals who fall
into this category and invest in derivatives. See Thomas C. Singher, Regulating
Derivatives: Does Transnational Regulatory Cooperation Offer a Viable Alternative to
CongressionalAction?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1397, 1403-04 (1995).
51 See Singher, supra note 50, at 1403. Governmental entities include federal,
state, and local governments and branches thereof.
52 Although the discussion herein repeatedly refers to for-profit organizations, local
governments and pension funds are of equal or even greater concern due to their
potential detrimental effect on the noninvesting public. Thus, all principles discussed
apply equally to nonprofit organizations.
53 See Singher, supra note 50, at 1404.
54 An affiliate is usually formed to conduct derivatives activity to avoid minimum
capital and other regulatory requirements. See infra Part I for an explanation of the
complex regulatory scheme and players.
55 See Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1993,
2003 (1995).
56 GENERAL AccT. OFF. REP., supra note 14, at 5.
57 Risks generally faced by all business organizations include interest rate, foreign
exchange, commodity price, credit, liquidity, theft, catastrophe, competitive/strategic,
and business cycle. See FINANCIAL Accr. STANDARDS BD., A REPORT ON
DELIBERATIONS, INCLUDING TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ON CERTAIN ISSUES, RELATING
TO ACCOUNTING FOR HEDGING AND OTHER RisK-ADJUSTING Acnvrrrms (1993)
[hereinafter FASB REPORT].
58 See id.
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was coupled with the relatively recent trend of increased volatility in interest
and foreign exchange rates as well as stock and commodity prices. 59
Confronted with such market movements, users of derivatives are primarily
motivated by the desire to mitigate or capitalize upon this volatility. Attempts to
alter risk may be made at a general or more specific level. Derivatives can be
used to manage portfolio risk60 or in hedging61 against risk of loss from adverse
price or rate fluctuations that may occur in owning or owing items (assets,
existing liabilities, firm commitments to buy or sell, and anticipated, but not
contractually committed, transactions such as purchases, sales, or the issuance
or refinancing of debt) over a period of time.62
2. Lower Funding Costs
Another important use of derivatives involves the reduction of transaction
5 9 See GENERAL Accr. OFF. REP., supra note 14, at 24. Foreign exchange rates
became increasingly volatile after the Bretton Woods system of fixed currency rates was
abandoned by the industrialized nations shortly after the United States ended the gold
standard. See id. at 24 n.1. Today, currency rates fluctuate according to supply and
demand. See id. at 24. Similarly, interest rate volatility has increased since the Federal
Reserve changed its policy controlling interest rates. See id. at 24 n.2. Finally, price
volatility exposures encountered by various organizations are partially attributable to the
"growth in international commerce and finance." Id. at 24.
60 See id. at 99. Hedging activities of groups of assets and liabilities is termed
"dynamic portfolio management," and "characterized by the continuous assessment and
periodic adjustment of the risk in groups of assets, liabilities, and binding commitments
of an enterprise." Id. This cost-effective technique is commonly used because it takes
"maximum advantage of naturally offsetting positions in the portfolio and... adjust[s]
only for the portfolio's net remaining exposure." Id.
61 [H]edging typically refers to a strategy of entering transactions or financial
positions whose primary purpose and effect is to protect an enterprise from
potential losses by reducing its exposure to price risk. An enterprise enters into a
hedging relationship by acquiring or creating an instrument .... or combination
of instruments, whose changes in value are expected to move inversely with the
changes in value of the instrument or position being hedged .... Transactions or
positions that reduce the risk of loss also may reduce the potential for gains.
FASB REPORT, supra note 57, at 6.
62 See John E. Stewart, The Challenges of Hedge Accounting: The Explosion of
New Hedging Instruments Has Outpaced Accounting Guidance, J. AccT., Nov. 1989,
48, 48 (defining hedging as "the act of taking a position in a hedging instrument-such
as in the futures, forward, options or swap market-opposite to an actual position that's
exposed to risk").
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costs and tax burdens, and the avoidance of regulations. 63 Some derivatives
allow users to attain more desirable financing by working with other
participants to take advantage of differences in the rates at which they can
borrow money.64 This use may allow a company with a lower credit rating to
swap its floating interest rate for a desired fixed rate which it could not have
otherwise attained except at a premium.65 In addition, the use of hedging
techniques described in Part I.A.1 can actually enhance the credit rating of a
borrower, so banks will lend to them at lower rates.66 Derivatives are often the
most cost-effective method for users to achieve their goals because of the
reduced transaction costs and leverage offered. 67 Instead of purchasing or
selling the actual underlying asset, synthetic financial instruments68 are created
which achieve the same results without encountering the transaction costs or
regulatory limitations.69 Most important, these derivatives are often far less
expensive, but herein also lies risk. An investor need only put down a fraction
of the value of the underlying security given a certain capital base, encouraging
overextension and increasing exposure in an attempt to recoup losses. 70
3. Derivatives for Profit
Speculation71 and arbitrage72 opportunities in derivatives are primarily
63 See SMrrsON ET AL., supra note 24, at 61-66, 271.
64 See GENERAL Accr. OFF. REP., supra note 14, at 29.
65 See id.
For example, a company with a medium credit rating may wish to protect against
rising interest rates by obtaining fixed rate borrowing but may not wish to pay the
higher interest rate normally paid by companies of its credit quality. The company
may be able to arrange lower fixed rate financing by first obtaining a floating rate
loan and then entering into a swap contract with a higher rated counterparty.
Id.
66 See id. at25.
67 See id.
68 Synthetic instruments are the result of a strategy linking two or more distinct
instruments whose collective characteristics resemble those of a prototype instrument.
See FASB REPORT, supra note 57, at 99.
69 Unlike exchange-traded derivatives, many hybrid derivatives securities escape
collateral requirements and receive favorable accounting treatment, because they do not
fit within the existing regulatory or accounting systems. See SMTrrnON Er AL., supra
note 24, at 426.
70 This leveraging feature can bring big profits or even larger losses. See Evans,
supra note 11, at 65.
71 A market participant speculates by "assum[ing] risk in attempting to profit from
anticipating changes in market rates or prices." GENERAL Accr. OFF. REP., supra note
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undertaken by dealers and very sophisticated investors, who also employ
hedging techniques to limit their loss exposure. Dealers earn fees and
commissions by advising their clients on risk management and writing
derivatives contracts to meet these needs. 73 Tax and regulatory "arbitrage" 74
"enables the firm to earn a risk-free profit by exploiting differences in tax
and/or regulatory environments. "75 Tax and regulatory avoidance is also
facilitated by derivatives which escape definitional schemes of governing
rules. 76
B. Risks of Derivatives
Categories of derivatives-related risks include credit,77 market,78 legal,79
14, at 25.72 Arbitrage capitalizes on price differentials in the same instruments between
markets or exchanges, generating a modest profit for the trader while making the
markets more uniform and efficient.
73 Thus, dealers can earn profits whether trading on their own account or simply
facilitating transactions for various parties. The financial institution at the center of
much of the legal debate about derivatives, Bankers Trust, derived the majority of its
earnings from aiding its clients in managing financial risk and from its own trading of
derivatives and other assets for its own account. See Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 1994
ANNUAL REPORT 15-16 (1995); see also discussion infra Part m.C.
74 Tax and regulatory arbitrage differs from traditional arbitrage between markets.
See supra notes 72-73.
75 SMrrHSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 253-55. This is usually accomplished by
"an 'unbundling,' in effect, of currency and interest rate exposure from the tax rules."
Id. However, this use of derivatives represents a very small portion of the derivatives
market and has been curtailed by regulatory changes in the United States and abroad.
76 Avoidance of an entity's own policies is also possible in this fashion. For
example, a fund manager whose portfolio guidelines limit him to the purchase of
dividend-paying common stock may purchase an equity-based derivative whose value is
contingent upon nondividend-paying stocks. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 55, at 2005.
77 Credit risk, a familiar concept, is the loss which would occur if the counterparty
"fail[ed] to meet its financial obligations under the contract." AmRucAN INsT.
CERTmIm PUB. Acr., supra note 22, at 5. This risk is often measured as the
replacement cost or "current market value of an identical" derivative. Id. Credit risk is
greatly reduced when derivatives are traded on an organized exchange where protections
include margin requirements and daily settling of open positions, among others. See id.
End-users of OTC derivatives, on the other hand, must fully research the counterparty's
financial stability and be concerned with settlement risk, the exposure which arises
when "a counterparty... faill[s] to perform under a contract after the end-user has
delivered funds or assets." Id. Settlement risk may be limited by master netting
agreements. Id. at 6.
78 Market risk accounts for "economic losses due to adverse changes in the fair
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control,8 0 and systemic.81 This Note will primarily focus on control risk and
systemic risk. Control risk is also termed operations risk and "broadly refers to
the risk that losses will occur as a result of improper or undesired functioning of
trading or management systems." 82 Adequate understanding by management
and internal controls can minimize control risk. The risk which most legitimates
government involvement is systemic risk, the threat that financial markets may
be undermined by derivatives activity.
Harsh critics of derivatives see them as a threat to the entire financial
system because they act as bridges between the various markets, which have
become increasingly volatile. 83 A General Accounting Office ("GAO") report
stressed that the United States OTC market is controlled by only "fifteen major
U.S. dealers that are extensively linked to one another, end-users, and the
exchange-traded markets." 84 Because of these close interrelationships, the
report concluded that "the sudden failure or abrupt withdrawal from trading of
any one of these large dealers" could present serious risks to the liquidity of the
value" of derivatives, and encompasses price risk, liquidity risk, and valuation or model
risk. Id. Price risk is driven by changes in the underlying interest rates, foreign
exchange rates, and "other factors that relate to market volatilities." Id. Basis risk
describes "the differing effects market forces have on the performance or value of two
or more distinct instruments used in combination." Id. Liquidity risk is the risk that a
holder may not be able to sell or close out a derivative position, thus affecting its value
adversely. See id. This risk is higher with OTC derivatives because of the lack of
standardization. Valuation or model risk relates to "the imperfections and subjectivity of
models and the related assumptions used to value derivatives." Id.
79 Legal risk reflects the chance that a derivatives-related contract may be
unenforceable due to legal or regulatory action. This risk might arise, for example,
because of poor contract drafting, adverse tax law changes, or statutory action
prohibiting derivative activity. See id. Although at one time this was a significant threat
to many OTC derivatives, particularly regarding netting agreements, many industry
experts, including the Federal Reserve, attacked the problem, and legal risks have been
somewhat decreased. For a discussion, see David M. Lynn, Comment, Enforceability of
Over-the-Counter Financial Derivatives, 50 Bus. LAW. 291 (1994).
80 Control risk reflects loss exposure resulting from inadequate (or nonexistent)
"internal controls to prevent or detect problems... hinder[ing] an end-user from
achieving its operational, financial reporting, or compliance objectives." A~mmcAN
INST. CERTIFED PuB. AccT., supra note 22, at 6. The understanding gap is included in
internal control weaknesses, i.e., the end-user does not know enough about derivatives
activity to design and monitor proper internal control systems. See id.
81 At least thirteen types of risks have been associated with derivatives. See Cohen,
supra note 55, at 2006-13.
82 Singher, supra note 50, at 1343.
83 See GENERAL Accr. OFF. REP., supra note 14, at 15.
84Id. at 7.
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market, and to other players involved-including federally insured banks and
the financial system in its entirety.8 5 Pointing to recent debacles and
uncontrolled incidents like the taxpayer bailout of the savings and loans and the
October crash of 1987, naysayers call for immediate and strong regulation. 86 It
is interesting to note that despite concern about possible systemic breakdown,
"[tihe GAO did not propose restricting any derivative products or limiting their
use."87
Derivatives' supporters downplay the risks involved, insisting that
derivatives actually make the markets more stable88 and efficient because of
their volatility and interconnectedness. 89 Another systemic advantage of
derivatives cited is that market linang may reduce financial disruptions by
simply "spreading the disturbance among more firms and markets." 9°
II. LEGISLATION AND REGULATION DimCuLTES
The following has been a typical pattern in the United States financial
community: after new, attractive financial instruments are developed which
make multi-millionaires out of some wise or lucky participants, the popularity
of these instruments grows absent complete understanding of risk potential.91
85 Id.
86 See id. The GAO's principal recommendation is to subject insurance companies
and brokers to the same strict examinations and regulations, including capital rules, as
federally insured banks. Other recommendations include enhancing accounting
standards, forcing end-end-users to have better controls, and fostering international
harmony and cooperation. See id. at 15-16.
87 Hansell, supra note 7, at Dl, D9. After the Barings collapse, both Greenspan
and SEC Chairman Levitt defended derivatives and denied the need for regulation. See
Roger Fillion, Greenspan Calls for Calm on Derivatives, Cm. SUN-TDmS, Jan. 6,
1995, at 50.
88 The joint study by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Comptroller of the
Currency inferred that international and inter-market linkages may have a stabilizing
effect. Using the 1992 European currency crisis as an illustration, the study noted that
"it is unlikely that the underlying markets would have performed as well as they did in
September without the existence of related derivatives markets that enabled currency
positions to be managed, albeit with some difficulty in some instruments." FED.
DEPosrr INS. CORP., DERIVATIvE PRODUCT Acvrrmns OF COMMERCIAL BANKS, IN
JoINT STUDY CoNDuCrED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED BY SENATOR RIEGLE ON
DIEIVATIVE PRODUCTS 4, 18 (Jan. 27, 1993).
89 During testimony before a House subcommittee, Chairman Greenspan called the
risk of a taxpayer bailout "negligible." See Saul Hansell, Derivatives Get a Key
Supporter, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at Dl.
90 Booth, supra note 8, at 519.
91 For a discussion of futures and options-themselves derivatives-leading to the
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What follows are significant financial crises through fraud or market movement
which attract governmental attention. Finally, some type of response is formed,
which usually results in an organized exchange or registered dealer associations
and heavy regulation to protect the financial system and investing public. In this
fashion, the instruments are then standardized and ceilings and floors are
designed to moderate volatility and ensure adequate capital for losses,
decreasing credit and legal risks. However, the impetus and primary benefit of
most OTC derivatives is their flexibility and unique nature, 92 making it
problematic for a standardized exchange or clearinghouse to be created without
destroying the fundamental advantage of the products. 93
Legislative or regulatory action concerning derivatives is complicated by a
number of factors. 94 Because many derivatives do not fall neatly under an
existing definition or regulatory scheme, there are a myriad of public and
private organizations currently involved in a part of the derivatives market,
many of which have different regulatory philosophies as well as specific
practices. 95 Additionally, the derivatives market is international in scope, and
any long-term solution must involve a transnational effort to be effective. Intra-
and international jurisdictional issues would have to be settled to achieve
creation of the Chicago Board, see Louis ENGEL & HENRY HEcHT, How TO BUY
STOCKS 221-47 (8th ed. 1994).
92 Although OTC products necessarily involve heightened credit risk, the ability to
customize the notional amount, strike price, maturity date, and exercise features without
regard to margin requirements or position limits attracts end-users with individualized
needs. See Robert J. Schwartz, Swaps and Other Derivative Instruments, in SWAPs AND
OTER DERiVATiVEs iN 1995, at 9, 76 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1995).
93 See Carrie R. Smith, OTC Derivatives: Clearing Away the Risk, WALL ST.
& TEcH., Feb. 1994, at 48 (discussing the pros, cons, and future potential of
clearinghouse mechanisms for certain derivative products).
94 For a thorough examination of the various public and private agencies with roles
in derivatives, as well as recent legislative proposals, see Singher, supra note 50,
arguing against regulation and legislation.
95 As previously mentioned, OTC derivatives dealers are primarily large banks,
securities or commodities dealers, and insurance companies. The banking institutions
are regulated by the Federal Reserve ("Fed"), the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC"), the FDIC, and the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"). Only the
Fed and the OCC have expressed interest in derivatives activity to date. The two
regulatory bodies with primary responsibility for the regulation of financial instruments
are the SEC and the CFTC, which regulate securities and commodities futures and
options, respectively. It is often difficult to ascertain under which, if any, umbrella a
new financial instrument belongs. See, e.g., Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883
F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 1989). Finally, because insurance companies are regulated on a
state-by-state basis, regulations may vary significantly.
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uniform regulation. 96 A related issue is that customized derivatives were
invented in this country, and any regulation must attempt to maintain the
competitive edge of the United States. Regulatory attempts that dampen
financial creation and innovativeness will do so to the detriment of U.S.
interests. The demand for these instruments will not lessen, so dealers will
merely be driven offshore. The derivatives market is very new and some fallout
is to be expected. Although there is legitimate concern that those who create
these instruments do not fully understand the full range of possibilities
associated with their creations, regulators can certainly not be immediately
expected to fully appreciate the complexities either. Until the understanding gap
is considerably narrowed, heavy-handed regulation might fail because of
inability to keep up with the pace of new invention. Absent a thoughtful and
comprehensive definition and scheme, financial wizards can find and capitalize
upon loopholes in the same fashion as tax experts. 97 Experience may be the
best teacher concerning the new products.
This is not to say, however, that nothing should be or is being done to
tackle the problem of derivatives. In an effort to avoid legislation, six of the
largest Wall Street derivatives dealers98 have formed the Derivatives Policy
Group and developed voluntary dealer guidelines in conjunction with the
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC') and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC"). 99 Although this is a welcome and much needed step,
the guidelines are only voluntary and many derivatives dealers are not members
of this group.' 00 In addition, the SEC, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC"), and the Financial Accounting Standard Board ("FASB")
have recently announced modest, new requirements-mostly focusing on
96 See Roy C. Smith, Risk and Volatility, WAsH. Q., 117, 117 (Autumn, 1995)
(discussing recent international crises and regulatory weaknesses).
97 See Cohen, supra note 55, at 2027-28. Cohen contends that derivatives "evolve
too quickly to be encompassed in any kind of regulatory net" and that their real
challenge is "the difficulty they pose to the orthodox and increasingly irrelevant
regulatory structure." Id. Cohen concludes that because derivatives need no costly
federal oversight, the patchwork of federal and state regulations of banking, securities,
and insurance should be reconsidered and largely dismantled.
98 They are CS First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch,
Salomon Brothers, and Lehman Brothers.
99 This report includes provisions for regular risk disclosure to counterparties and
voluntary reporting to the requisite agencies on the management of the firms' own
derivatives risks. See DERIVATIVEs PoLIcY GROUP, A FRAMEWORK FOR VOLUNTARY
OvERsIGHT OF THE OTC DERIvATIvEs Acr~naEs OF SEcuRrrEs FIRM AFFiLATEs TO
PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND STABIrrY IN FINANCIAL MARKErS (1995).
100 Most notably absent are the much beleaguered Bankers Trust and the entire
insurance industry.
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increased disclosures-but promise continued efforts. 101  Despite early
efforts, 102 Congress now appears unlikely to pass any significant legislation
restricting derivatives activity or creating a new regulatory agency. 10 3 This
reprieve may be only temporary, however, so derivatives market participants
should continue and even increase voluntary action.
Despite large-scale losses, Congress and regulators should tread warily.
Minimum capital requirements,' 0 4 clearinghouse proposals,' 0 5 new regulatory
agencies, suitability requirements, 106 and registration and new rules for
101 See infra Part HLI.B for a discussion of reporting and accounting regulations.
102 After continued derivatives loss headlines, Congress appeared poised to enact
some legislation in this area. See, e.g., Derivatives Limitations Act of 1995, S. 557,
104th Cong. (1995) (prohibiting banks and other federally insured financial institutions
from engaging in speculative derivatives trading); Risk Management Improvement and
Derivatives Oversight Act of 1995, H.R. 20, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposed by
Congressman Leach, this bill would have created a Federal Derivatives Commission,
strengthened powers of federal banking regulators, amended existing laws to encompass
derivatives activity, and authorized the Federal Reserve to approve a derivatives self-
regulatory agency of dealers). Perhaps due to recent elections, however, as well as
Congressional testimony recommending caution, the prospect for passage is now
doubtful. See infra note 103.
103 See Pamela Atkins & Niles S. Campbell, Congress Unlikely to Break New
Ground with Banking Bills; Reg Review Rolls On, [1996] Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA) No. 25, at C-1, C-3 (Feb. 7, 1996). House Banking Committee Chairman Leach
noted that "recent efforts by the OCC and SEC have pushed financial derivatives
legislation off the front burner for this year." Id. Representative Leach also noted,
however, that future "legislation still may be needed" particularly in the areas of
accounting practices and "forming an interagency council to develop regulation applying
to all financial institutions and derivatives products." Id.
104 Minimum capital requirements would require a derivatives dealer to be
collateralized at a certain percentage of either the dealer's notional amount of
derivatives or value at risk.
105 As discussed supra Part I, a clearinghouse mechanism facilitates strict
regulation and daily settling and largely eliminates the risk of default because the
clearinghouse itself is the counterparty to the transaction.
106 Suitability requirements in the derivatives context would demand that dealers
evaluate the capability of the counterparty to understand, independently evaluate, and
bear the risks of a transaction. Legal scholars are currently divided as to whether
suitability rules would be detrimental or are needed. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Frederick,
Note, Not Just for Widows & Orphans Anymore: The Inadequacy of the Current
Suitability Rules for the Derivatives Market, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 97, 139 (1995)
("The duty to determine suitability should be placed on investment professionals who
understand [these] complex derivatives," and suitability requirements should be included
in adopted versions of the Derivatives Oversight Act and the Derivatives Supervision
Act, which "provide for cooperative regulation of the derivatives market[.]"); Geoffrey
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derivatives dealers may eventually be necessary, but wide-scale action at this
time may do more harm than good. Effective capital requirements require a
more uniform and accepted method of calculating market value and risk than is
currently the case. Various federal agencies, private think tanks,107 and
industry groups have made considerable progress on potential solutions, but this
work should be further developed before any legislation is enacted.
II. IMMEDIATE STOPGAPS TO IMPLEMENT
The most significant threat to derivatives dealers and users right now is the
"understanding gap" between investors and market participants, and the
requisite knowledge needed to successfully invest in derivatives. This
understanding gap was the natural result of the phenomenal growth of
derivatives products and technology, which outpaced management and investor
knowledge, as well as the existing control and regulatory systems. Most, if not
all, of the well-publicized derivatives disasters are attributable to a lack of
understanding of the risks of the products and the market and an appreciation of
the importance of internal controls. Furthermore, accounting for derivatives
and disclosure requirements does not give financial statement users sufficient
information with which to properly assess derivatives activity and
management's capabilities. If this existing state of affairs continues, so will
losses and litigation. This gap, however, can be closed voluntarily with a
modest effort by participants in the derivatives market, along with some
assistance from public and private governing bodies.
A. Internal Control Sstems and Policy
1. Broker/Dealers
Although wide-scale regulation is as yet premature, certain actions can be
B. Goldman, Note, Crafting a Suitability Requirement for the Sale of Over-the-Counter
Derivatives: Should Regulators "Punish the Wall Street Hounds of Greed?", 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 1112, 1159 (1995) (advocating "a limited two-tier suitability requirement" to
require of dealers disclosure only for "sophisticated investors" but "a stronger,
affirmative suitability" duty of dealers vis-t-vis other end-users); Daniel G. Schmedlen,
Jr., Note, Broker-Dealer Sales Practice in Derivatives Transactions: A Survey and
Evaluation of Suitability Requirements, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1441, 1474 (1995)
(Stating that antifraud provisions apply under the Commodity Exchange Act and federal
securities laws and are sufficient to protect investors; furthermore, suitability
requirements are unnecessary due to market pressures and thus potentially harmful).
107 For example, some of the most well-respected and oft-cited research regarding
derivatives has been done by Paul Volcker's Group of Thirty.
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taken by sellers and traders of derivatives in order to limit losses, avoid
litigation, and perhaps stave off legislation. Many of the largest derivatives
dealers have "voluntarily" agreed to enhanced controls and disclosures to
customers and regulatory agencies.108 The most important control over
derivatives traders is to ascertain that their trades will be properly accounted
for, so that performance can be properly monitored. This requires complete
segregation of duties between the "front office," where derivatives are created,
traded, and sold to clients, and the "back office," which records derivatives
transactions and monitors positions.' 0 9 Clearly delineated roles, exposure and
position limits, and proper supervision of traders should also be established and
closely monitored on a continual basis.
Another peculiarity of traders which enhances the likelihood for over-
aggressiveness is the compensation scheme. Traders are rewarded for short-
term performance and seldom rewarded with long-term contracts. Thus, job
security as well as bonuses are tied to short-term profits, which may actually
encourage traders to sacrifice the long-term stability of their organization. Due
to the highly leveraged nature and unparalleled upside potential of some
derivatives, they are the most obvious choice for zealous traders seeking quick
profits. One solution would be to reward long-haul performance and sign
traders to longer-term contracts. 110 In addition, the concern about federally
insured deposits at banks and protecting customers' accounts in case of
derivatives losses is legitimate and calls for separate entities or subsidiaries for
derivatives trading.
Despite the fact that internal control improvements are in the dealers' best
interests, excessive optimism may be misplaced despite recent proposals due to
the lengthy history of faulty controls at many of the largest and most respected
Wall Street firms and banks.111 Whether this refusal to learn from past mistakes
10 8 See Richard Lapper, Report Calls for Broad Reform of Derivatives: Barings
Collapse Triggers Proposals for Big Changes by Futures Industry Group, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 20, 1995, at 25. This proposal is aimed at improving internal controls
and increasing transparency in the exchange-traded markets. Id. For discussion of
private activity on the OTC front, see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
109 Id.
110 In fact, the OCC is currently drafting a set of rules which "would tie traders'
compensation packages to long-term performance by the institution, rather than to
quarterly profits and losses." James Srodes, Warning Labels, FIN. WoRL, Jan. 2,
1996, at 16. However, this agency's jurisdiction is currently limited to banks.
I11 See Kurt Eichenwald, Learning the Hard Way How to Monitor Traders, N.Y.
TIrms, Mar. 9, 1995, at D1, D5 (describing the Barings incident as indicative of an
industry's lax practices). Noted failures which were or should have been apparent to
management included incidents at E.F. Hutton, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Salomon
Brothers, Prudential-Bache Securities, and Kidder Peabody. See id.
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is an unfair characterization or simply an unavoidable symptom of the
unbridled, high-pressure competition associated with financial markets is moot.
Some type of regulatory assurance that internal controls are adequate is
essential and not overly intrusive.
2. End-Users
A fundamental premise of this Note is that nonfinancial companies as end-
users should never enter into derivatives for speculation or any purpose other
than risk management. Particularly in the case of public companies, investors
and creditors make investment decisions on the basis of the particular core
operations of organizations. If investors wish to speculate in the derivatives
market, they may do so with their own funds. Investors view derivatives as a
cost and are skeptical, as they should be, of management's ability to run a
derivative profit center. Corporate treasurers usually do not have the expertise
necessary to speculate successfully on derivatives, nor is this their function,
particularly in light of losses by so-called experts. Finally, heavy involvement
in derivatives may divert and impede management's focus on its central areas of
operations, particularly in the case of important financial personnel. 112
Decisions to use derivatives for risk management must be made from the
top of the organization, including the chief executive officer, senior
management, and the board of directors' 13 or a committee thereof. 114 This is
not to say that senior management must actually calculate the numbers
themselves, but they must accept responsibility to research fully and review the
company's investments and risk management. In order to generate profit, risk is
a necessary evil of capitalism. Some risks, however, may be so removed from
the industry, expertise, and control of a company and its customers that it
behooves the company to work to minimize these peripheral risks, such as
foreign currency volatility.
The first step is to assess and attempt to quantify risk in light of the
company's overall strategic objectives. Next, management should decide which
risks warrant attempts at mitigation, keeping in mind that there are other means
112 This is idea is from the commentary of Paul J. Isaac, a noted investor and
former chief economist at a major securities firm. See Paul J. Isaac, Using Derivatives:
What Senior Managers Must Know, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 33, 40.
113 This term includes their counterparts in not-for-profit and governmental
organizations, although for illustrative purposes this Note will focus on profit-seeking
organizations.
114 For a summary outline of suggestions from various public and private bodies
regarding derivatives controls, see Brandon Becker & Francois Mazur, Risk
Management and Internal Controls, in 1 27TH ANNuAL INsT. ON SEC. REG. 351
(Practicing Law Institute ed., 1995).
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besides derivatives to manage risk. Industry experts recommend using relative
probabilities and ranges rather than single value estimates, and stress
determining what drives the risk. 115 Risks which are driven from the same
parameters should be grouped together so that organizations may internally net
out the minimal risk number requiring external risk management devices. 1 16
Because the decision to utilize derivatives requires a serious commitment and
potential loss exposure, derivatives should be used only if they are necessary
and will be beneficial. Although this is often true, the process of deciding
whether derivatives will work and at what amount must not be short-circuited
or the consequences may be devastating. In addition, initial and continued risk
analysis is beneficial from an overall business standpoint, as well as helpful, in
understanding the goal of derivative use as merely supportive of the
organization's central operations.
After deciding to use derivatives, senior management and the board should
implement clear, written guidelines demarcating policies of the company, lines
of authority, and levels of review. The policy must be clearly explained and
fully enforced. The board of directors may decide to appoint a special
committee or perhaps independent experts to assess and review underlying
derivative policies, control procedures, changing market conditions, and the
potential risk exposure therefrom, as well as portfolio balance and activity.
Involvement leading to informed decisions by the board of directors and senior
management is likely to improve performance or, if losses occur, serve as
evidence in support of top management in case of litigation.117
The internal controls are of the utmost importance and must include proper
segregation of duties, education, and training of the finance department,
communication and review by senior management, and maintenance of
computer systems capable of recording, tracking, and valuing derivatives.
The financial staff should be responsible on a daily basis for the derivatives
portfolio and is vital to the successful use of derivatives to manage the
company's risk. Therefore, hiring decisions, communication, and training are
important. Essential characteristics include education, technical competency,
115 Many ideas in this section were considered after reviewing suggestions in two
valuable sources. See Isaac, supra note 112, at 33; J. Carter Beese Jr., The CEO's
Guide to Derivatives, CHIEF ExEcuTvi, Mar. 1994, at 92.
116 See supra note 115.
117 In general, the business judgment rule states that as long as a director acts in
good faith and with due care in the procedural sense, the director will not be found
liable even though the decision itself was not that of the ordinarily prudent person. The
procedural due care test will be met if the director takes appropriate steps to become
informed about the derivatives and the company's activity in particular. See, e.g.,
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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knowledge of the organization's overall objectives, and integrity. Although big
decisions are made from the top, the financial staff should be involved as much
as possible so as to understand its role in the strategic goals of the company.
Better decisions will be made if traders and others understand the reasons
behind their hedging activity, such as facilitating entry into a new, international
market. If the financial staff sees the big picture, it may be able to think
creatively and devise better solutions. Personnel must be given adequate
resources as well, including training or consultation with experts about the risks
and opportunities of derivatives.
The most important resource may be a computer system which can record,
track, and value the portfolio on a daily basis. A recent study has shown that
end-users are woefully lacking in technical as well as managerial expertise. 118
Technology has increased so that various scenarios can be run by the system
and analyzed. In this fashion, the company can examine its portfolio given the
worst case, as well as more likely scenarios, to ascertain that the company is
aware of and willing to live with the downside potential. This function may be
performed in-house, on-line, 119 or contracted to outside experts, similar to
actuaries who service pension plans for companies.
Although this proposal may be objected to because the counterparty dealers
have the state-of-the-art computer systems to price and assess portfolio risk,
end-users must understand the inherent conflict of interest between themselves
and their counterparties. End-users must recognize that dealers have their own
profit motives which are usually served, regardless of whether the end-users'
"needs" are met. By increasing the derivatives complexity and customizing it to
the end-user's needs, a dealer may decrease competition and increase its profit
margin. Furthermore, there are times when a dealer needs to cover an exposed
position and has an incentive to write a derivative which may or may not be the
wisest choice for the end-user. Only by maintaining an independent pricing,
valuation, and risk measurement system can end-users ensure that their needs
are met. Additionally, daily tracking of the portfolio can minimize losses by
allowing early recognition, adjustment, and, if necessary, exit from exposed
positions.
As previously stated, prudent end-users are not involved in derivative
activity to turn a profit. Thus, significant gains as well as losses should be
118 See Joanne Morrison, News and Trends: Survey Finds Corporations are
Lagging Financial Firms in Gauging Value at Risk, TBE BoND BuYER, Dec. 12, 1995,
at 24 (reporting a survey that concluded that 66% of respondents did not "have 'an
adequate understanding or the necessary in-house expertise to effectively' measure value
at risk").
119 Integral Development Corporation Announces RiskNet, World's First
Derivatives Management System Delivered On-Line, Bus. WiRE, July 6, 1995, at 10.
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avoided. If either sharp gains or losses occur, top management should
investigate existing controls, making sure there is no speculation or guidelines
which have been violated. Reassessment of types of derivatives and positions
held should also be reexamined to ascertain that any unforeseen risks are
closed.
Furthermore, it is crucial that the compensation schemes of the company's
finance department and traders responsible for derivatives do not contain profit
incentives which would undermine the company's risk management policies. In
other words, trading profits on derivatives should never result in a bonus or
raise. Perhaps a risk-conscious compensation plan could be developed instead,
basing bonuses on how well the risk was managed or how close to estimates the
derivatives portfolio ended.
Finally, the control structure must be routinely monitored by both internal
and external auditors. The audits should include internal control testing of
computer systems and compliance with the end-users' policies. The results of
these audits should be reported to the audit committee of the board of directors
and the results of the external audit should be included in the organization's
annual report.
B. Financial Reporting, Disclosure, and Audit Guidelines
Investors, creditors, and other financial statement users rely upon consistent
accounting and disclosure standards to ensure the reliability, consistency, and
comparability of financial statements. Financial statement uses include:
evaluation of management, assessment of borrowing power, and selection of
investment opportunities. Indeed, one of the fundamental protections for
investors to select and monitor their investments is uniform financial
reporting. 120 Unfortunately, current financial accounting standards do not
provide sufficient information about derivatives activity to financial statement
users.121 Recent proposals, however, by the SEC and the FASB purport to
120 See GENERAL AcCr. OFF. REP., supra note 14, at 92. The GAO concluded that
the "[e]ffective functioning of our economy depends upon financial information that is
widely used being reliable and clearly understood." Id.
121 See SPECIAL COMM. ON FIN. REPORTING, AMERICAN INsT. CERTIFIED PUB.
Accr., IMPROVING BusiNss REPoRTING-A CusroMim Focus: MEETING THE
INFORMATION NEEDS OF INvEsTORS AND CREDrrORS 76 (1994):
[Ulsers are confused. They complain that business reporting is not answering
important questions .... What [innovative financiall instruments has the company
entered into, and what are their terms? How has the company accounted for those
instruments, and how has that accounting affected the financial statements? What
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improve and unify disclosure and accounting standards. This Note concludes
that these proposals would make the financial statements more complete and
informative and should be adopted immediately. Unlike wide-scale regulation,
these proposals would not dictate a code of conduct nor limit any type of
product or transactions. Providing relevant information about exactly what type
of risk management or profit strategies are being utilized and their impact on an
entity will allow statement users to make informed decisions. By increasing
transparency and the free flow of information, the derivatives market may
develop even further.
1. Flaws, Gaps, and Conflicts in Current Accounting Guidelines for
Derivatives
Readability and confidence in the reliability of financial statements is based
upon preparers' conformance with generally accepted accounting principles
("GAAP") promulgated by the FASB. 12 GAAP includes both accounting for
transactions 123 within the body of the financial statements and disclosure
requirements. 124 A primary objective of GAAP is to accurately portray an
entity's financial position and activity. Although the accounting guidelines for
standardized foreign currency forward and futures contracts have been fairly
consistent for some time, 125 accounting for options, swaps, and other forward-
risks has the company transferred or taken on?
Id. 122 The FASB is an "independent" private authority whose pronouncements have
the force of law because compliance with generally accepted accounting principles is
necessary to illicit an unqualified audit opinion. Public companies must have annual
audits and many private companies must have independent audits as well in order to
obtain financing. However, the FASB serves two "clients": (1) the government or some
arm thereof, which threatens to take over the regulation of accounting and auditing if
the FASB moves too slowly; and (2) the FASB's more conservative, private-sector
constituents, who pay the bills. The FASB is funded by contributions "from public
accounting firms, banks and others in the end-user community, along with corporate
gifts," while document sales and publication subscriptions also generate some revenues.
FASB Makes Tentative Decisions on New Approach for Derivatives, 23 Pens.
& Benefits Rep. (BNA) 401, 402 (Feb. 5, 1996).
123 See GENERAL Accr. OFF. REP., supra note 14, at 93. Accounting standards
"define how... transactions... should be recognized, measured, and reported
in... the financial statements." id.
124 See id. Disclosure requirements provide additional quantitative and qualitative
data, including information about financing or contractual arrangements, relevant to the
interpretation of financial statements in the footnotes to the financial statements. See id.
125 See, e.g., FOREIGN CURRENCY TRANSLATION, Statement of Financial
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based derivatives remains dreadfully inconsistent and has been improving at a
slow pace. 126 Therefore, financial statement users cannot accurately gauge the
use or impact of derivative activity on an entity.
Existing accounting guidance is incomplete, inconsistent, and complex,
resulting in financial statements in which the effects of derivative transactions
are not transparent. 127 Accounting standards only directly apply to a limited
number of derivatives and transactions.1 28 Thus, entities must turn to a variety
of sources, 129 including nonauthoritative literature, to "determine how to
account for specific instruments or transactions." 130 Because of this lack of
authoritative guidance, "accounting by analogy" is the informal industry
standard, as gaps are filled by accounting practitioners based on their own
creativity. 131 Basically, this means that financial statement preparers
subjectively account for derivatives based on common industry practices or by
attempting to analogize limited, existing standards.
Under this ad hoc approach, a number of analogies are utilized and are
indeed defensible, although subject to later challenge; therefore, they are not as
reliable as many preparers would like. Of course, entities may utilize the
method which most favorably states their financial position. Therefore, many
derivatives are carried "off-balance-sheet" regardless of their use, giving
financial statement users inadequate and inconsistent information. 132 Even if
there is authority on point, the accounting guidance reveals inconsistent
Accounting Standards No. 52, § 162 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1996);
ACCOUNTING FOR FtrrEtS CONTRACTS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 80, § 15 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1996).
12 6 An SEC accountant has chastised the FASB for the lack of "'guidance at all in
many areas,"' and particularly noted that "'the accounting literature for swaps is badly
outdated.'" SEC Accountant Sutton Calls for Action on Derivatives, Acr. TODAY,
Dec. 11, 1995, at 14 (citation omitted). The GAO found that no specific accounting
rules existed for swaps and options, let alone the multitude of complex hybrid
derivatives. See GENERAL Acer. OFF. REP., supra note 14, at 93.
12 7 See ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE AND SIMILAR -NANciAL INsTRUMENTs AND
FOR HEDGING AcTvrrms, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 162-3,
§§ 44-48 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1996) [hereinafter FASB Statement No.
162-B].
128 Foreign exchange contracts and exchange-traded futures contracts are granted
hedging treatment by Statements 52 and 80. See id. at J 45; see also supra note 126 and
accompanying text.
129 The only authority on other products is issued by the FASB's Emerging Issues
Task Force on an ad hoc basis.
130 FASB Statement No. 162-B, supra note 127, at 47.
131 See id.
132 See id. at 45.
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treatment for similar hedges, for valuing derivatives, and for assessing risk and
measuring hedge effectiveness. 133 Inconsistent reporting of similar transactions
and dissimilar reporting of similar transactions abounds.134 Due to these
problems, the nature and effects of derivatives are not apparent to financial
statement users. The natural result of "accounting by analogy" is reported
results which are misleading and lack the transparency needed to provide users
with relevant information for decisions.' 35 Entities may or may not have
recognized derivative activity in the financial statements; disclosures about the
derivatives' rights, obligations, and effects are often omitted or not
discernible.136
The FASB's hedging and derivatives accounting project has been four
years in the making but is still only a work-in-progress.' 37 The project manager
for the FASB admits that there still exists a "knowledge gap" between
accountants and the derivatives markets.' 38 Thus, considerable inconsistency
exists in accounting for derivatives and, according to some cynics, "in the
prospects for improvement. " 139 Part of the problem is that many accounting
standards are based on the classic distinctions between assets, liabilities, and
equity, which derivatives tend to blur so that they do not fit neatly into the
traditional framework. 40 Derivatives accounting is also complicated by existing
hedging criteria which are difficult to apply, and the varying nature of the
products and objectives of the users.141 The complexity of many derivatives
also creates problems in timing and measurement issues of recognition. 142
Some assert that outdated accounting guidance may actually have an adverse
effect on the innovation and effective use of the derivatives market, thus
inefficiently stunting the market's growth. After exploring several scenarios to
133 See id. at 46.
134 See GENERAL Accr. OFF. REP., supra note 14, at 93.
135 See id. at 94.
136 See FASB Statement No. 162-B, supra note 127, at 48.
137 See June F. Li, FASB's Project on Financial Instruments, OHIo CPA J., Apr.
1995, at 14.
138 See Halsey Bullen, Accounting Treatment of Derivatives, in Minehan
& Simons, supra note 11, at 17.
139 Id. at 18. Bullen notes that although the FASB project began in 1986,
fundamental problems still exist due to the double entry nature of an accounting system
designed primarily for cash instruments, not those which can fluctuate between asset
and liability or debt and equity status. See id. at 17.
140 See Todd E. Petzel, Derivatives: Market and Regulatory Dynamics, 21 J.
CoRP. L. 95, 108 (1995).
141 See GENERAL AcCT. OFF. REP., supra note 14, at 94-99.
142 See id.
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resolve these issues,143 the FASB issued an exposure draft in June of 1996
regarding consistent accounting standards for all derivatives. 144
2. Current Required Disclosures: The Next Best Thing?
Despite, or maybe due to, the lack of uniform accounting standards, there
has been significant progress in disclosures regarding derivatives. 145 Prompted
by continued SEC insistence, 146 the FASB has gradually improved required
disclosures of derivatives activity. 147 The 1994 issuance of FASB Statement
No.119 offered an important increase in required disclosures to assist investors
in making informed decisions. 148 This statement was necessary to supplement
FASB Statement No. 105, which did not include derivatives without off-
143 These scenarios include: (1) mark-to-market all sides of the hedge; (2) defer
recognition of all gains and losses or only to the extent that the hedge is effective; (3)
mark derivatives to market with realized gains and losses to earnings and defer
unrealized gains of risk management derivatives in a special equity component, a
combination of the last two; and (4) derecognition-when an asset is taken off the
balance sheet and sold or securitized. See Minehan & Simons, supra note 11, at 4.
144 See Steve Burkholder, FASB Makes Tentative Decisions on Scope, Definition
for New Derivatives Approach, BNA's Banking Rep., at 162 (Feb. 5, 1996); see also
infra Part llI.B.3.b.
145 Besides the two important releases described in this section, other agencies are
increasing disclosures as well. Beginning in March of 1995, banks have new
requirements to be included in their call reports. See Christine Tate, Derivatives
Accounting & Disclosure: What's Next?, BANK MGMT., May-June 1995, at 16, 24. The
new Call Report disclosures are consistent with FASB Statement No. 119 and GAAP,
but go one step further by "requir[ing] banks to disclose the income-statement effect of
derivatives they use for non-trading purposes." Id. This new step is in addition to
banking agencies "requiring additional disclosures" for "structured notes and High-Risk
Mortgage Securities." Id.
146 See Jay Mathews, Levitt Pushes Accounting Board on Derivatives Rule, WASH.
POST, Dec. 13, 1995, at Fl.
147 The three most recent disclosure statements include: DIscLosURE OF
INFORMATION ABOUT FINANciAL INSTRUMENTS wrTH OFF-BALANCE-SHEET RISK AND
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS wrrIH CONCENTRATIONS OF CREDIT RISK, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 105, (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1990);
DIsCLOSuRIS ABOUT FAIR VALUE OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 107 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1991) (requiring
fair value disclosures for some financial instruments, unless not practicable, in which
case descriptive information essential to estimating fair value must be disclosed);
DIScLOsURES ABOUT DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND FAIR VALUE OF
FINANCI.L INSTRUMENTS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 119
(Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1994).
148 See FASB Statement No. 119, supra note 147.
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balance-sheet risk of accounting loss. 149 In addition, FASB Statement No. 119
amended FASB Statement No. 107 to insist that fair value information be
presented in a clearer fashion to financial statement users.
150
The major provisions of FASB Statement No. 119 require the following
disclosures: (1) the distinction between instruments held or issued for trading
purposes and those for purposes other than trading, (2) the contractual (or
notional) amount and nature and terms of all derivative financial instruments-
as defined narrowly in the statement; (3) the average fair value of derivatives
held or issued for trading purposes during the period should be reported; (4)
the net gains or losses from trading activities must be disaggregated and the
classes of instruments giving rise to those gains and losses identified; (5) a
description of the objectives and strategies for holding and issuing derivatives,
identifying the classes of derivatives used in achieving those objectives; (6) the
accounting policies for derivatives, and specific disclosures about anticipated
transactions hedged with derivatives; and (7) fair value information for
"financial instruments" (which excludes some derivatives) presented on the
face of the balance sheet or in the footnotes.
The narrow scope of the statement is problematic. To expedite issuance,
the FASB chose to focus only on disclosures, rather than substantive accounting
policies. 151 FASB Statement No. 119 also applies only to its narrow definition
of "derivative financial instruments"; it does not apply to instruments with
similar characteristics, like commodity derivatives. 152 Furthermore, the FASB
failed to define "such key terms as speculation, risk management, and even
hedging," leaving the door open for conflicting interpretations by preparers.
153
A recent study by the FASB reviewing derivatives disclosures after FASB
Statement No. 119 demonstrates some compliance but is largely inconclusive
149 FASB Statement No. 119 also amended statements Nos. 105 and 107 to require
additional disclosures which had previously been optional, mainly whether the
derivative is entered into for trading or other purposes, i.e., risk management. Id.
150 Specifically, FASB Statement No. 119 provides that fair value information be
presented without aggregating or netting the value of derivatives with nonderivatives,
and that assets and liabilities be clearly identified and distinguished. The amendment
also demands that disclosures be located in either the body of the financial statements or
in the same footnote, along with the carrying amount of related assets and liabilities.
151 See Cheney, supra note 48, at 12.
152 See Steven Woodward, et al., FASB 119 & Derivative Financial Instruments:
Disclosure & Fair Value, NAT'L PuB. AcCT., Jan. 1996, at 18, 19. Nor does FASB
Statement No. 119 apply to "on-balance sheet items like mortgage-backed securities,
interest only and principal only deb[t] .... instruments indexed to the price of gold,
silver or equity securities .... and optional features that are embedded in an on-
balance sheet receivable or payable." Id.
153 Id.
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about the quality of the disclosures. 154
3. Recent Proposals for Improving Reporting for Derivatives
Because of the aforementioned inconsistency and incomprehensible nature
of derivatives reporting, both the SEC and the FASB have issued proposals
addressing disclosures and accounting. Although the SEC's dictates are
supreme to those of the FASB, the SEC has traditionally respected the FASB's
role in promulgating accounting standards, which have the full backing of the
business community even if not the force of law. It remains to be seen how
these two proposals will be melded together.
a. SEC Release on Enhanced Disclosures
After a review of company filings which it found deficient, the SEC
addressed the deficiencies of FASB Statement No. 119 in a recent proposal. 155
The SEC acted after concluding that current disclosures were insufficient and
users were still "'confounded by the... complexity of financial
instruments. '"156 The goal of this release was to "clarify and expand accounting
regulations S-X and S-K" relating to footnote disclosure in interim and annual
reports, allowing users "to analyze the potential impact of derivatives to the
company's bottom line and shareholder value."157
The proposed amendments have three major thrusts. First, they require
enhanced footnote description of accounting policies for material derivatives
activity. 158 As previously described, inconsistency abounds in accounting for
derivatives, resulting in a severe lack of comparability among financial reports.
Although the SEC has left uniform accounting recognition and measurement
154 See JEFFREY P. MAHONEY & YosmNoI KAWAMURA, FIANcIAL Accr.
STANDARDS BD., SPECIAL REP. No. 156-A, REvIEw OF 1994 DIscLOsupms ABOUT
DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INsTRUmENTs AND FAIR VALUE OF FINANCIAL INsTRUMENTs,
(1995). The fiscal year ending December 31, 1994 was the first year of implementation
of this standard for companies with total assets of $150 million or more; however, most
companies involved in derivatives will meet this requirement and were well aware of the
impending pronouncement.
155 See SEC Issues Derivative Accounting Rule, THE MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE,
Jan. 15, 1996, at 1.
156 61 Fed. Reg., supra note 11, at 580 n.23 (quoting AssOCirTION FOR INV.
MGMT. & RES., FINANCIAL REPORTING IN THE 1990s AND BEYOND, at 30 (1993)).
157 Dominic Bencivenga, Derivative Disclosure: SEC Rules on Data Required in
Annual Reports, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 11, 1996, at5.
158 The materiality of derivatives activities would be measured by their fair values
during and at the end of each reporting period. See 61 Fed. Reg., supra note 11, at 579.
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standards to be developed by the FASB, 159 required disclosure of accounting
methodology should provide users with the information to assess the financial
statement impact of derivatives activities and compare various companies'
financial reports. The SEC proposal also extends FASB Statement No. 119
disclosures to commodity as well as financial derivatives.160
Second, the SEC has addressed FASB Statement No. 119's biggest
shortcoming, its failure to require entities to disclose quantitative information
about the risks of derivatives. Despite cries from preparers regarding excessive
costs and the lack of uniformity in pricing and other models, every organization
entering into derivatives uses some models to assess their risks internally.
Although consistent risk measurement may not be a reality at this point, entities
should disclose their risk calculations along with information about the assets,
liabilities, or operations underlying the risk that is being managed. Quantified
information regarding the market risks of derivatives would enable users to
assess the success of the risk management strategy given the stated objectives.
Therefore, the SEC proposal calls for additional disclosures of quantitative and
qualitative information outside the financial statements, most notably concerning
the all-important market risk, deemed by some the most relevant figure to
investors. 161 The quantitative data may be presented using one of three
proposed alternatives' 62 and should "include the actual dollar investment in
derivatives, performance projections and the risk to earnings, fair value and
cash flow." 163 This move was prompted by the failure of most companies to
159 See discussion, infra Part mI.B.3.b.
16 0 See 61 Fed. Reg., supra note 11, at 579.
161 See id. Again, however, these disclosures are only "required if any of the
following items are material: the fair values of market risk sensitive instruments
outstanding at the end of the current reporting period or the potential loss in future
earnings, fair values, or cash flows of market risk sensitive instruments from reasonably
possible market movements." Id.
162 The three disclosure alternatives include:
i. Tabular presentation of expected future cash flow amounts and related
contract terms categorized by expected maturity dates;
ii. Sensitivity analysis expressing the possible loss in earnings, fair values, or
cash flows of market risk sensitive instruments from selected hypothetical changes
in market rates and prices; or
iii. Value at risk disclosures expressing the potential loss in earnings, fair
values, or cash flows of market risk sensitive instruments from market movements
over a selected period of time with a selected likelihood of occurrence.
Id.
163 Bencivenga, supra note 157, at 5.
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follow FASB Statement No. 119's recommendation and to provide market risk
information, or to do so in a piecemeal fashion in different parts of the financial
statements. 164 "The... qualitative information about market risk [must]
include a narrative discussion of... a registrant's primary market risk
exposures" and how these exposures are managed, including strategies,
objectives, and instruments utilized. 165
Third, the SEC was kind enough to "remind" registrants that disclosures
about "financial instruments, commodity positions, firm commitments, and
other anticipated transactions" must be accompanied by "information about
derivatives that affect directly or indirectly such reported items, to the
extent... material and necessary to prevent the disclosure about the reported
item from being misleading." 166
Critics of the proposal argue that the disclosures will prove costly,
impractical, irrelevant or confusing to users, and detrimental to their businesses
by forcing disclosure of competitive advantages. 167 Large, decentralized
organizations, which may utilize different monitoring systems, claim the
quantitative disclosures are too burdensome and would force system changes to
accommodate the new requirements. 168 Furthermore, the SEC's view of risk
management on a product basis conflicts with a line of business approach taken
by many banks. 169 End-users claim the required disclosures do not track actual
risk management methods used by entities. Specifically because nonderivatives
risk management techniques are often used internally but excluded by the SEC
proposal, the resulting disclosures may be incomplete or materially
misleading. 170
The narrative disclosures also draw criticisms from preparers, who claim
that it is difficult to put this type of information into a clear format for users and
164 See 61 Fed. Reg., supra note 11, at 579 (footnote omitted).
165 Id. at 579.
166 Id.
167 Opposition to the proposal includes Big 6 accounting firms, banks,
corporations, and numerous other groups. See Second Thoughts on SEC Proposal:
Revamping Disclosures, 6 CFO ALERT 9, Mar. 4, 1996, at 1; Paul G. Barr, Companies
Slam Derivatives Disclosure Plan, PENSIONS & INVESTMEN, July 8, 1996, at 43;
Louis Bisgay, Trends in Financial Management, 78 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING
PRACnCES 1, July 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9578183; Joanne Morrison,
Regulation: TMA Tells SEC to Hold Off on Derivatives Disclosure Rules, BOND BUYER,
June 18, 1996, at 31.
168 See SEC Deliberating on Final Issues in Derivatives Disclosures Proposals, 9
CFO ALERT, Sept. 30, 1996, No. 37.
169 See id.
170 See Morrison, supra note 167.
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that the risks do not warrant this high-level treatment. 171 Preparers assert the
proposal would add too much information and disclosures in an already
overburdened financial reporting system, and the required level of detail may
make it harder for investors to understand the company's derivatives use. The
lack of relative ease of a disclosure, however, does not mitigate heavily against
its adoption: if an entity cannot logically explain its derivatives use to investors,
perhaps its policies are in need of review.
Another concern is that the disclosures will give a distorted view of
derivatives activity because of their sheer length. Emphasizing derivatives
exposure may de-emphasize their primary role as risk management tools,
causing derivatives activity to appear riskier and investors to discriminate
against firms which utilize derivatives. More important risks may exist which
should also be discussed in the Management Discussion and Analysis
section. 172 This information may not make statements comparable because
portfolios and positions held vary. The scope of the proposal is also a subject of
contention in the opinion of some end-users, who believe current disclosure
requirements are sufficient, and only financial institutions and derivatives
traders should be required to disclose such information. Nonetheless, an
overwhelming number of experts and investors in these end-user companies
believe this information is crucial for informed investment decisions, as well as
shaping internal policies and attitudes. 173
Many claim the SEC action was a premature overreaction to a few isolated
abuses. This camp claims that since the implementation of FASB Statement No.
119, voluntary disclosures and reporting have increased with market demand, a
trend that will continue absent SEC involvement. t74 Furthermore, regulation
will only stifle innovation in risk management and reporting, as firms will have
no incentive to develop better models. 175 The most important criticism leveled
against the disclosure of risk valuation methodology is that it will stifle market
innovation and place entities at a competitive disadvantage. 176
171 This may be particularly challenging for smaller organizations who are not used
to disclosing this type of information.
172 See Bisgay, supra note 167.
173 See id.
174 See Morrison, supra note 167.
175 See id.
176 Although sophisticated derivatives dealers and users maintain internal risk
evaluation and pricing systems, they argue that forced disclosure will destroy their
competitive edge. This zero-sum game, however, between competitors can have very
high stakes even to parties who do not wish to play. Entities using faulty or inferior
models (particularly if not disclosed) can create financial disasters for investors, bank
customers, and all taxpayers. There is a higher marginal utility for society to
disseminate better information, equalize competitive playing fields, and avoid financial
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Protesters also assert that the proposed disclosures will place additional
burdens on corporations and securities attorneys by introducing a "wave of
complex information into the marketplace" and a corresponding wave of
shareholder litigation, particularly from increased disclosure and projections in
the Management Discussion and Analysis section of the report. 177 On the other
hand, noted derivatives expert Professor Hu concludes "[i]n terms of liability,
on the whole, disclosing more probably helps you" 178 and these disclosures
provide management with the argument that "the public can't argue they didn't
know." 179 Furthermore, the SEC has announced its intention to provide a "safe
harbor" for forward-looking disclosures along the lines of provisions in the
recently enacted Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.180 Critics
also agree that the SEC should work jointly with the FASB and coordinate
efforts before final issuance.181 Harsher cries can be heard to let the FASB do
its own work. However, it was precisely because the FASB was not acting that
the SEC intervened in the first place.
In some respects, even this proposal might not go far enough. Registered
investment companies and small business companies are exempt from
disclosing the qualitative and quantitative information about risk management
policies and market risk, although they must disclose their accounting policies
for derivatives activity.18 2 Therefore, a major class of small investors in mutual
funds still would lack important data relevant to investment decisions.
On the whole, the SEC action represents important improvements in
derivatives reporting, and should be formally enacted.' 83 There is a risk that
havoc. Moreover, this is not like forcing one to reveal trade secrets like the Coke
formula. Although some pricing and risk strategies may give competitive advantages,
issuers and traders still make their money by researching and anticipating market
movements, and end-users earn profits in their essential lines of business.
177 See Bencivenga, supra note 157, at 5-.6.
178 Id. at 6 (quoting derivatives expert Professor Hu). According to Hu, "[t]he
additional disclosure could help companies in shareholder litigation." Id.179 Id. (quoting attorney Robert Todd Lang, chairman of the American Bar
Association's Task Force on Hedge Accounting).
180 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 & 18 U.S.C. (1995)).
181 See Morrison, supra note 167.
182 See SEC Seeks Comments on Proposals Concerning Derivatives Accounting, 23
Pens. & Benefits Rep. (BNA) 100, 101 (Jan. 8, 1996).
183 The SEC is supported in its efforts by at least one important player. A Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago study concluded that regulators should intervene if companies
fail to reveal derivatives holdings and policies willingly. The study concludes that
market discipline is insufficient to force voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, controls
must be built in to ensure that the disclosures are unbiased and accurate because of the
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flooding users with voluminous disclosures may be overwhelming to all but the
most sophisticated investor. The most valuable information has always been and
should continue to be contained within the financial statements themselves.
However, until financial accounting standards are formally improved, these
disclosures are the only consistent and reliable information presented to
investors, and as such are essential.
b. FASB Responds: A Proposal to Unify Derivatives Accounting
The SEC may have done the FASB a favor by absorbing all of the above
criticism. While the business community's ire was directed at the SEC, the
FASB finally issued an exposure draft intended to clarify and standardize
accounting for derivatives. 184 This proposed statement concludes that all
derivatives are assets or liabilities and requires they be recognized at fair value
in the statement of financial position.'8 5 As previously discussed, many
derivatives are reported off-balance-sheet, the rationale given is that they are
only a mutual exchange of promises (an executory contract) without any initial
transfer of tangible assets or consideration.' 86 If historical cost is used to
measure and report derivatives, their value is nothing. Using cost, however, is
irrelevant and even misleading because derivative positions are rights or
obligations that may be settled for cash at any time. Derivatives clearly have a
market value, and their volatility argues for inclusion on the balance sheet, not
invisibility from the statements. The FASB deemed fair value the most relevant
measure for financial instruments in general and "the only relevant measure for
derivatives." 187 Adjustments to the carrying amount of hedged items should
reflect offsetting changes in their fair value (gains and losses) arising while the
hedge is in effect.
The statement compromised by permitting favorable hedge accounting
treatment if a derivative is intended for and designated as a fair value hedge,
tendency to report good news and bury bad. See Jaret Seiberg, Capital Briefs: U.S.
Should Force Derivatives Disclosure Series, AMERIcAN BANKER, Oct. 15, 1996, at 8.
184 See FASB Statement No. 162-B, supra note 127, at 1 32. If adopted in its
current form, the proposed statement would be effective for fiscal years beginning after
Dec. 15, 1997.
185 See id. at 11 3 & 10. Transition adjustments resulting from adoption are
reported in net income or other comprehensive income as the effect of a change in
accounting principle. See id. at 11 33-34. The FASB returned to basics by finding in
derivatives the essential characteristics of assets and liabilities as defined in FASB
Concept Statement No. 6. See id. at 11 53-54.
186 See id. at 1 54.
187 See id. at 55.
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cash flow hedge, or a hedge of foreign currency exposure. 188 Gains and losses
resulting from changes in the value of the derivative are accounted for based on
these designations and, logically, tied closely with the item being hedged in
terms of recognition and timing. 189 The FASB considered and rejected mark-to-
market accounting for all derivatives, 190 perhaps the simplest approach to
implement because it would treat all derivatives equally in a formal sense.191
This method was opposed by many financial statement preparers who charged
that it would distort earnings and equity and fail to match derivatives with the
assets or liabilities they are designed to hedge. 192 If a derivative does not
qualify, however, as a hedge, any gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the
period of change. 193 The FASB acknowledges that its proposal is but an interim
step "to address the immediate problems about the recognition and
measurement of derivatives while the Board's vision of carrying all financial
instruments at fair value" 194 on balance sheets continues to be pursued. The
draft will be "reconsidered as the Board continues to address the issues in its
broad project on financial instruments."195
The scope of the exposure draft is broad. It applies to all entities and is
expanded from past pronouncements, superseding or amending nearly every
188 Seeid. at 3 & 11.
189 Changes in the value of derivatives used as fair value hedges for assets,
liabilities, or firm commitments are recognized as gains or losses in earnings in the
period of change along with the offsetting change in the hedged item. The basis of the
hedged item is adjusted accordingly. Cash flow hedges are designed to protect against
exposure due to a forecasted transaction's variable cash flows; changes in the hedge's
value are recognized in earnings on the projected date of the transaction as part of other
comprehensive income. Changes in value of derivatives which hedge against foreign
currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation may be split. The portion
of the change equivalent to a foreign currency transaction gain or loss is reported as part
of the cumulated translation adjustment, i.e., reported outside of earnings in other
comprehensive income. If there is any remaining change, it is recognized in earnings.
See id. at Summary.
190 One FASB proposal would require that "change in fair value for derivatives
classified as a trading activities would be recognized in earnings in the period they
occur. Unrealized changes in the fair value of derivatives held for risk management
purposes would be recorded as a separate component of equity until realized. All
realized gains and losses would be recognized in earnings." Tate, supra note 145, at 22.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See FASB Statement No. 162-B, supra note 127, at Summary (stating that
nonprofit organizations must recognize changes in the fair value of derivatives as a
change in net assets in the period of change).
194 FASB Statement No. 162-B, supra note 127, at 42.
195 Id.
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statement applying to derivatives and hedging. 196 This proposed statement
avoids the limited definition of financial instruments previously utilized in
FASB pronouncements. Derivatives are deliberately defined using flexible,
common characteristics to avoid circumvention by creators of instruments and
to anticipate and accommodate future derivative products. 197 The definitional
characteristics are broad enough to include financial instruments with embedded
options as well as freestanding derivatives. 198
The proposed statement requires certain disclosures relating to derivatives
activity and would completely supersede FASB Statement No. 119. Entities
who hold or issue derivatives must disclose their objectives for doing so and
any context needed to understand these objectives, as well as their strategies for
achieving them.199 Specific disclosures must include the face or contract
amount when necessary to enable investors to understand what the entity is
trying to accomplish with its derivatives use; the entity must distinguish between
types of hedges and other derivatives. 20° Additional disclosures are required
based on each type of hedging activity and for derivatives not designated as
hedges.20' For all hedging activity, the entity must describe the risk
management policy, the item being hedged, the classes of derivatives and how
they are being used to hedge.202 Most important, the entity must disclose gains
or losses on derivatives and hedges, as well as those gains and losses not
recognized, and how these transactions are reflected in the financial statements.
196 If adopted, the statement would amend FASB Statement No. 52 to permit
special accounting for foreign currency forecasted transaction derivatives hedges, and
FASB Statement No. 107 to comply with its measurement and disclosure provisions.
FASB Statements No. 80, No. 105, and No. 119 would be completely superseded, and
the proposed statement would nullify or modify to compliance any conclusions reached
by the FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force, a committee designed to deal with
emerging accounting issues in a timely fashion but whose pronouncements lack the
mandatory character of FASB Statements. See FASB Statement No. 162-B, supra note
127, at Summary.
197 The distinguishing characteristic of a derivative is that a holder can settle the
contract with only a net cash payment, which is determined by reference to changes in
the price of an underlying.
198 See FASB Statement No. 162-B, supra note 127, at 6 & 69. However,
certain instruments or contracts with some derivatives are excluded, e.g., insurance
contracts. See id. at 7.
199 See id. at 31.200 See id.
201 See id. (listing the required disclosures for fair value hedges, cash flow hedges,
hedges of currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation, and nonhedging
derivatives).2 02 See id.
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If the derivative is not designated as a hedge, 20 3 the entity must describe the
purpose of the activity and disclose the amount of gain or loss recognized
during the period and again demonstrate where the resulting amounts are
reported in the financial statements. This information must be disaggregated by
class, business activity, risk, or other category consistent with the management
of that activity.20 4 The business community prefers this approach to the single
method required in the SEC's proposed disclosures. 205 The SEC apparently is
considering adopting more flexible guidelines for qualitative disclosures,
perhaps permitting the "management approach" of disclosures based on how
companies view their business lines.20 6
The FASB has acknowledged the costs of its proposal and the dissension it
has created.207 As opposed to Congress and the many federal regulatory
bodies, the FASB will not promulgate standards unless there is a significant
need to do so where the expected benefits would exceed the perceived costs of
the additional information provided.208 Entities may have to incur the expense
of changing their accounting systems and policies to comply with this
statement.20 9 Much of the required information, however, is substantially the
same as was previously required so it should be already available to financial
statement preparers. 210 Also, the statement does not grant hedging treatment to
certain types of risk management strategies, like macrohedging and rollover
203 Some synthetic derivatives which may be designed to manage risk do not
receive hedging treatment under this proposal.204 This is somewhat of a retreat from FASB Statement No. 119.
2 05 See Focus on FASB: SEC Approach to Swaps May Clash with FASB's, 6
INSURANCE AccouNTANr, Mar. 11, 1996, at 10.206 See id.
207 Compare FASB Statement No. 162-B, supra note 127, at 1 189-94, with id. at
11 195-205. Two FASB members dissented because they believed derivatives should be
classified only with respect to risk management, using the comprehensive income
approach and deferring gains or losses until recognized. The FASB, however,
concluded that this approach would make comprehensive income very volatile, perhaps
dissuading risk management strategies. On the other hand, the FASB feared that
earnings and per share information would be too easily manipulated under this approach
because of the liquidity of the derivative market. Management could buy or sell very
similar products to generate gains or losses without changing its position. See id. at
11 195-205.
208 See id. at 189. Organizations subject to GAAP and financial statement end-
users often vehemently disagree as to the relative costs and benefits of the FASB's
actions. The FASB also attempts to adhere to a principle of neutrality in promulgating
standards, which are to reflect economic realities rather than favor or discourage certain
types of transactions. Id.
209 See id. at 1191.
210 See id.
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hedging.211 Although comments were received that this statement will further
complicate accounting treatment, the FASB seems confident that replacing the
existing structure of a variety of statements and other sources of authority used
by analogy with a unified standard greatly simplifies accounting. 212 Unsaid is
the fact that this standardization stops entities from analogizing to the most
favorable financial statement treatment. The FASB finally notes that the
proposed statement would actually decrease many of the disclosure
requirements previously in effect. The proposal discontinues the need to assess
risk at an entity-wide level, which many complained was expensive and
difficult. Furthermore, the statement expands hedge accounting treatment to
more types of derivatives if certain conditions are met.213
This statement eliminates inconsistencies in existing guidelines and should
meet its goals by establishing consistent recognition and measurement guidance
for all derivative and hedging activities. The result is increased visibility,
comparability, and understandability of the risks associated with derivatives
while accommodating a reasonable range of hedging accounting practices.
Finally, derivatives are truly a global phenomenon-used, sold, and
exchanged in every major market in the world. To achieve comparability and
transparency, an eventual goal must be international harmony of accounting
reporting standards. 2t 4 Inconsistent practices across jurisdictions can lead to
vastly divergent results. For example, Metallgesellschaft showed a profit under
American accounting standards but German accounting guidance on the same
data and period yielded a loss in the hundreds of millions.215 The international
community should work to agree on a single, practical method of reporting
derivatives activity to prevent confusion. Although this is a daunting, long-term
project given the various cultures, politics, and varying practices involved,
minimum disclosures of reporting methodology would be an easy first step.
C. Legal Risks of Internal Control Failures and Insufficient Disclosure
In addition to business risks which should scare organizations into
improving disclosures, internal controls, and policies, another potent motive
211 See FASB Statement No. 162-B, supra note 127, at 192.
212 See id. at 193.
213 See id. at 194.
2 14 See id. at 43. The FASB recognizes this and in 1995 it coauthored a report
with representatives of the accounting bodies of the UK, Canada, Australia, as well as
the International Accountant Standards Committee. See Jane B. Adams & Corliss J.
Montesi, Major Issues Related to Hedge Accounting, FASB SPECIAL REPORT, Oct.
1995.
215 See Petzel, supra note 140, at 108-09.
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also exists: the threat of an equally unpredictable loss exposure due to
litigation.216 Because of dramatic losses by companies, 217 investors, and
governmental bodies, there has been a corresponding increase in litigation
revolving around derivative activities. 218 The defendants in these lawsuits are
both end-users and dealers in derivatives. One legal expert has identified the
four principal theories driving derivatives litigation as ultra vires, 219 contract, 22 0
fraud, 221 and suitability claims. 222 After uncovering incriminating tapes by
216 This should be of particular concern to directors of companies. See Meredith
M. Brown & James H. Cheek I, Director Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws,
27TH ANNUAL INST. ON SEC. REG. 443 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1995).217 Harvard Law Professor Hal S. Scott noted that "[b]y some accounts, at least 30
multi-million-dollar lawsuits involving derivatives are currently in various stages of
disposition." Hal S. Scott, Theories of Legal Liability in Derivative Transactions, in
Minehan & Simons, supra note 11, at 19.
218 This should not, however, chase organizations out of the derivatives market,
particularly given the realities of a fluctuating, risky marketplace. In Brane v. Roth, 590
N.E.2d 587, 591-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), members of a grain co-operative were
awarded damages for management's alleged failure to hedge adequately the co-op's
position. To be sure, there is a significant distinction between relatively simple,
exchange traded commodity positions and more complex OTC derivatives, but this may
signal that there eventually might be placed upon management a "duty to hedge"
potential loss exposures within certain parameters. For a thorough discussion on
hedging and the role of corporate management, see Hu, supra note 1.
219 Ultra vires claims usually assert "that the customer was prohibited by law from
engaging in a particular transaction and therefore is not bound by that contract."
Minehan & Simons, supra note 11, at 19. Ultra vires theories have notably been
advanced in the Orange County bankruptcy (the California constitution prohibited the
transaction because the county's debt would have exceeded its revenue for the year) and
an action by a Chinese company against Lehman Brothers Commercial Corporation
(Chinese law prohibited the transaction). See id.
220 According to Professor Scott, contract claims are generally of two varieties.
The first type of contract claim is where the party is not bound by the contract due to
some factor like economic duress. See id. The second line of contract claims attempts to
include prior oral agreements in the contract; if these understandings were not included
in the contract, there was no meeting of the minds and thus no contract. See id.
221 Fraud claims in this matter are based both on common law or statutory
securities and commodities law.
222 Rules of suitability for derivatives depend substantially on the rules of self-
regulatory organizations such as the National Association of Securities Dealers and the
New York Stock Exchange. Suitability claims are also based on Rule lOb-5 or a
violation of fiduciary duty, and have four elements: (1) the defendant recommended or
purchased the investment for the plaintiff; (2) the investment was unsuitable for the
plaintiff; (3) the defendant either knowingly or recklessly, thus fraudulently,
recommended said unsuitable investment; and (4) reasonable reliance by the plaintiff on
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callous Bankers Trust ("BT") employees, Proctor & Gamble ("P&G") upped
the ante in its suit against BT by adding racketeering claims under RICO,
raising the possibility of triple damages. 223 P&G may have lost steam and thus
agreed to settle once the judge blocked these claims until after the trial on the
original fraud ended.224
In order to prevent litigation or mount an adequate defense, both sellers and
end-users of derivatives must be cognizant of this developing area of law and all
of its intersections. By implementing the internal controls suggested earlier,
including a standing independent committee of the board to vote on highly risky
transactions, management may be able to use the business judgment shield or a
consent theory in its defense.225 In addition, full disclosure has traditionally
been a defense to many actions, most notably fraud. Management should
provide investors with all relevant risk strategies, quantified data, and
independent audit reports.
Dealers as well must be aware of their responsibilities, even to supposedly
sophisticated users. Because they tout expertise and the ability to customize for
specific risks as selling features, dealers would be wise to investigate and
communicate underlying risks to investors who do not have the state-of-the-art
technology of the dealers. Although dealers deny any duty to investors, a
number of recent lawsuits demonstrate the risk of litigation. For example, the
role of Merrill Lynch in selling Orange County the highly leveraged derivatives
portfolio, the losses on which drove the county into bankruptcy, is being
questioned in court.226 The dealer which to date has been the subject of the
the recommendation of the defendant in maldng the investment. Minehan & Simons,
supra note 11, at 19.
223 See Kelley Holland et al., The Bankers Trust Tapes, Bus. WK., Oct. 16, 1995,
at 106, 108-09. Excerpts from BT employees discussing the leveraged derivatives sold
to P&G include: "'we set 'em up [sic]'"; "'[tihis could be a massive huge future gravy
train'"; "'they [(P&G)] don't [sic] understand the leverage'"; and "'[we] lure people
into that calm and then just totally f- 'em [sic]"' (describing derivatives "business" as
usual). Id. at 108, 110.
224 See P & G Derivatives Case Hits a Snag: Racketeering Claims Blocked, Hous.
CHRON., Apr. 6, 1996, at 8; see also, Saul Hansell, Bankers Trust Settles Suit with P
& G, N.Y. TIMEs, May 10, 1996, at Dl.
225 Most states impose fiduciary duties of care and loyalty on directors, see, e.g.,
Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985), although under Delaware law,
the standard for finding liability is one of gross negligence. See supra discussion of
business judgment rule at note 117 and accompanying text.226 See County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Chapter 9 Adversary
Proceeding No. 95-01045-JER (filed Jan. 12, 1995); County of Orange v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., Chapter 9 Adversary Proceeding No. 95-01045-JER (First Amended
Complaint, filed June 6, 1995).
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most legal action is BT and its subsidiary, BT Securities Corporation.227 BT has
settled many claims by its customers and also been reprimanded by the federal
regulators.2 28 BT recently won its first important victory in a London court,
where it was deemed not liable for losses suffered by an Indonesian concern.2 29
The most critical derivatives-related case, involving P&G, was recently
settled.230 This case had the potential to go far in defining the responsibilities of
derivatives dealers to their customers, including whether suitability
requirements would be applicable. 231 P&G claimed that BT fraudulently lured it
and other customers into unnecessarily complex derivatives. 232 BT countered
that P&G's sophisticated management made a conscious, albeit risky, choice
for which BT was not responsible. 233 The judgment on this issue did not go far
enough in shaping derivatives law, practices, and the relative duties of involved
parties. Although both sides have claimed victory, it appears that derivatives
dealers have again escaped. Nonetheless, this issue is far from resolved, so both
end-users and dealers would be wise to commit to writing the explicit terms and
understandings of their dealings.
IV. APPLICATION OF ENHANCED INTERNAL CONTROL AND REPORTING
TO EXAMPLES
To demonstrate that the above proposal is not just costly, academic
nonsense, two of the most significant and publicized derivatives scares will be
reviewed and tested. Realizing that hindsight is usually acute, every attempt will
227 BT has been involved with some of the most significant losses and legal actions
concerning derivatives, resulting in settlements, fines, sanctions, continuing litigation,
and one victory. See, e.g., Gibson Greetings, Inc. v. Bankers Trust, No. C-1-94-620
(S.D. Ohio 1994); In the Matter of BT Securities Corporation, [1994-1995 Decisions]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,477 (Dec. 22, 1994) (SEC); In the Matter of BT
Securities Corporation, 1994 CFTC LEXIS 340 (Dec. 22, 1994). See also Kenneth N.
Gilpin, $67 Million Settlement by Bankers Trust: Air Products Wins Dispute over
Money-Losing Derivatives Deals, N.Y. TuMls, Jan. 25, 1996, at D8; Richard Waters,
Bankers Trust Wins High Court Ruling, FIN. Tms (London), Dec. 4, 1995, at 22.
228 See Waters, supra note 227, at 22.
229 See id.
230 See Hansell, supra note 224, at D1 (discussing Proctor & Gamble Co. v.
Banker's Trust Co., 925 F.Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1996)).
231 See Saul Hansell, British Court Supports Bankers Trust in Derivatives Case,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1995, at 37 (derivatives expert Henry Hu noting the lack of
precedent in the area of derivatives litigation and speculating as to the influence BT's
British victory may have upon the litigation).
232 See Holland, supra note 223, at 108.
233 See id. at 109-10.
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be made to be realistic in application.
A. Barings Bank PLC
Beginning with perhaps the most disastrous and easiest in terms of
prevention, Barings appears to have been brought down by one rogue trader. It
is ndive, however, to merely blame the chief trader of Barings' Singapore
branch, Nick Leeson, rather than examine the astonishingly lax control
environment in which he was permitted to operate.234 Although these losses
were via exchange-traded derivatives, and thus ostensibly safer, the numerous
internal control issues are the same as with OTC derivatives. First and most
blatantly, the trading involved was only to be arbitrage, not speculation on the
Nikkei.235 The foundation of the internal control system should have been
designed to assure that only arbitrage trading occurred. Large losses and gains
are uncharacteristic of arbitrage and should have been reviewed by the trader's
supervisor and the practice halted.
In addition, trading and loss limits were ignored not only by the trader but
apparently by his supervisors as well. 236 The handsome bonuses Leeson and his
supervisors received for previously successful trades were increased incentive
for risk-taking. 237 Barings violated the cardinal segregation-of-duties principle
by allowing Leeson to perform both the front-office trading function and the
back-office recording function.238 Therefore, it was much easier for Leeson to
conceal his overrides of management controls. 23 9 Finally, Barings ignored and
failed to make public an audit which evidenced the dangerous control
environment at the bank.24 Proper internal controls may not have prevented
234 See Howard G. Chua-Eoan, Going for Broke: The Ego of a 28-Year-Old Trader
and the Greed of His 232 Year-Old Bank Combine to Destroy an Investment Empire,
Stunning the Business World, TIm, Mar. 13, 1995, at 40, 42.
235 See id. at 44-45. An earthquake in Kobe brought the Nikkei crashing down, at
which point Leeson began "doubling down" on his bets in an attempt to recoup his
losses. See id. at 45.
236 See id. at 46. Leeson appeared to have operated virtually unsupervised; in fact,
were it not for the Kobe earthquake, he would probably still be trading from Singapore.
Id. at 42-43, 46.
237 See Patrick Weever & Robert Tyerman, The Futures that Finished Barings,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 5, 1995, at 6.
238 See Chua-Eoan, supra note 234, at 46.
239 Apparently, Leeson concealed his losses in a discrepancy account which he set
up. THE STRAIGHTs TmS (Singapore), Sept. 12, 1995, at 25.
240 See Edith M. Lederer, Bank's Brass Faces Reports of Misdeeds: Mounting
Evidence Says Barings Management Ignored Warnings, HERALD-SuN (Durham N.C.),
Mar. 6, 1995, at Al.
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Leeson's initial fraud, but they would have detected and halted trading practices
and losses. Had it implemented these controls, the bank which helped finance
Columbus's expedition would still exist.
B. Procter & Gamble's Big Gamble
Certainly not an investing newcomer, the significant losses sustained by
P&G surprised many and resulted in actions by shareholders against
management as well as a lawsuit against and countersuit by a derivatives'
industry leader, BT.241 Lured into leveraged derivatives by a desire to minimize
financing costs in its domestic and international operations, P&G entered into
interest rate swaps to convert its fixed rates to floating rates, apparently
believing (as did most experts) interest rates would fall. 242 Although interest
rate. swaps are commonly used, the P&G swaps were variations on the "plain
vanilla" contract because "[e]very six months, the variable rate it paid would be
adjusted according to a very highly complex formula" devised by BT.243 This
formula resulted in sharp increases in interest payments.244 Therefore, when the
Federal Reserve began raising rates to slow the economy and halt predicted
inflation, P&G, like many who bet the same way, lost big.
P&G need not have sustained heavy losses in this case for a number of
reasons. First, if P&G had adequate systems to analyze the terms of the
derivatives at the inception of the contract, it would have at least recognized the
multiplier involved with rate increases. The risk may have exceeded numerical
or percentage maximums of company policy following the proposal in Part III
of this Note. This information would also have been communicated to senior
management and perhaps to the board or an independent committee thereof for
a vote. Furthermore, if full reporting and disclosure were required, this
information would be presented on the financial statements, and thus to
shareholders and creditors. It is plausible, if not certain, that if P&G's top
management had been more involved and fully recognized the loss potential,
they may have rejected or modified the derivative. Second, even if P&G had
not been dissuaded, periodic evaluation of the derivative position would have
presented the company with the information to attempt to exit the position early
and minimize losses. Third, if P&G relied on the expertise of BT, as they
claim, they would make certain that all such agreements were formalized in a
written, properly executed agreement. Finally, if P&G had in place the controls
241 See supra note 230.
242 See Saul Hansell, A Bad Bet for P&G: Soap Giant Strays into Speculation,
N.Y. TAMEs, Apr. 14, 1994, at D6.
243 Id.
244 See id.
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suggested earlier, they might have been able to mount a solid defense to any
shareholder action using the business judgment shield, having fully disclosed
the transaction to shareholders and the board.
V.CONCLUSION
Derivatives are an essential tool for the transfer of risks from those
unwilling or able to assume them to those more willing or able to do so. Given
the realities of volatile domestic and international markets, the proper use of
derivatives presents invaluable and unparalleled vehicles for modem entities.
While systematic regulation of the derivatives market must continue to be
studied and considered, caution is essential in order to preserve U.S.
competitiveness and ensure that any regulatory scheme is both effective and
efficient.
In the interim, however, immediate steps should be taken to assist and
protect financial institutions and end-users of derivatives. Full disclosure,
increased understanding and involvement by top management and the board of
directors, consistent reporting, and enhanced internal control systems will
provide a short-term solution to facilitate informed decisions about risk
management and investing. Although the proposed controls are essential to
every organization involved in derivatives, many will consider them an
unwarranted, costly intrusion into the private realm of management.
Nonetheless, because of the need for protection of the investing public, the SEC
and other bodies should continue to demand improved accounting and
disclosure standards, as well as the issuance of an internal control letter as part
of an independent audit. Absent systemic breakdown, future financial disasters
can be avoided.
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